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This study aims to provide empirical evidence about fraud pentagon theory in 
detecting perceptions of fraud with good corporate governance as moderating. 
The study was conducted at all PT BPRs in Bali Province who held positions 
as directors and commissioners. The sampling technique uses saturated 
samples and uses the Yamane formula and produces 225 samples that are 
worthy of study. The data analysis technique used in moderated regression 
analysis. The test results found that the pentagon theory fraud indicator namely 
pressure negatively affects the perception of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Opportunities and rationality have a positive effect on perceptions of financial 
reporting fraud. Competence and arrogance do not affect the perception of 
financial reporting fraud. GCG weakens the negative effect of pressure on 
perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. GCG weakens the positive 
influence of opportunity and rationality on the perception of fraud. GCG does 
not moderate the effect of competence and arrogance on perceptions of 
fraudulent financial reporting, but GCG is a type of potential moderation for 
the interaction of competence and arrogance. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Meckling & Jensen (1976), explains that agency theory is a theory that explains the relationship that occurs between 
principal and agent. The theory occurs because there are differences in interests between agents and principals. The 
differences in interests that occur make selfish qualities emerge in the agent (Einshardt, 1989). Perception of fraudulent 
financial reporting is one of the traits that will occur due to self-interest. ACFE Asia Pacific in 2018 explained that 
Indonesia was ranked 3rd of fraud in the Asia Pacific region and financial reporting fraud was one of the three most 
harmful types of fraud (ACFE, 2018). Cressey (1953), explains that fraud occurs as a result of pressure, opportunity, 
and rationality (fraud triangle theory). Horwarth (2011), then developed the theory and added 2 elements namely 
arrogance and competence. Empirical evidence has also been proven by several previous researchers who explain that 
pressure, opportunity, rationalization, competence, and arrogance have a positive effect on financial reporting fraud 
(Junardi et al. 2018; Tessa & Harto, 2016; Oka et al. 2018; Aprilla et al. 2018; Kusuma et al. 2017; and Puspitha & 
Yasa, 2018). Inconsistent with research conducted by Setiawati & Baningrum (2018); Kurnia & Anis (2017); 
Rengganis et al. (2019); Pamungkas et al. (2018); Septiarini & Handayani (2018); Husmawati et al. (2017); and Danuta 
(2017), in explaining the influence of pressures, opportunities, rationalization, competence and arrogance on financial 
reporting fraud. 
Self-interest that occurs in the agent can be minimized by issuing costs that are agency costs so that the agent can 
work in accordance with the interests of the principal. Meckling & Jensen (1976), explained that there are 3 types of 
agency costs that need to be spent by principals so that their interests can be in accordance with the interests of agents, 
namely 1) supervision costs 2) bonding costs and 3) residual loss. Frauds that occur and additional costs incurred can 
be detrimental to the principal so that GCG can be applied consistently to minimize this. Based on POJK number 4 / 
POJK.03 / 2015 article 2 (2) one of the reasons for applying GCG is to handle conflicts of interest that occur in rural 
banks. Empirically, it has also been proven by Aprilia (2017), who conducted research on all ASEAN companies 
implementing the ASEAN CG scorecard. The results showed that the five proxies in pentagon fraud on average had 
no significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The researcher concluded that the study sample was a company 
that had obtained the ASEAN CG Scorecard certificate, which company had been proven to run GCG well, so there 
was minimal fraud.  In'airat (2015), conducted on all companies listed on the Saudi Arabian stock market shows that 
corporate governance variables can reduce the level of fraud. The multiple regression analysis tests show that an 
internal audit (a proxy of GCG) plays a major role in reducing the level of fraud. But there needs to be existence, 
existence and consistent effectiveness in a company so that the implementation of governance is able to reduce fraud. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Previous research explains theoretically that individuals in fulfilling their personal interests will commit fraud to get 
out of this pressure zone, for example, the pressure to achieve financial targets (Akbar, 2017 & Rukmana, 2018). 
Research conducted by Oka et al. (2018), also found that pressures with a proxy for external pressures had a positive 
effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The conclusion is theoretically that individuals can achieve bonuses and high 
income can be achieved if they have maximum performance. The maximum performance here can be achieved by 
opportunistic actions namely financial reporting fraud. The results of the study are similar to those of Quraini & 
Rimawati (2018); Rukmana (2018) and Rengganis et al. (2019), who state that there is a positive influence on financial 
reporting fraud. 
H1: Pressure has a positive effect on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Research conducted by Kusuma et al. (2017); and Rukmana (2018), found a positive influence on opportunities for 
fraudulent financial reporting. The conclusion is theoretically to fulfill his personal interests, individuals will have the 
perception of cheating if they have the opportunity or when there is weak supervision in an organization/company. 
Muhsin & Nurkhin (2018), also explained that a large opportunity will make individuals inclined to commit fraud. The 
hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as follows: 
H2: Opportunity has a positive effect on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Empirical evidence found by Oka et al. (2018); Aprilla et al. (2018); Sanjaya & Dwirandra (2019); and Siddiq (2017), 
found that rationalization was proxied by auditor changes and measured by dummy variables had a positive effect on 
fraudulent financial reporting. Previous researchers explained that the change of auditor can be considered to eliminate 
traces of fraud found by the previous auditor. The tendency is to encourage companies to replace their independent 
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auditors to cover up the fraud contained in the company. Theoretically, it can be concluded that in order to fulfill 
individual interests, rationalization is done to cover up the perception of fraud that will be done so that the individual 
can avoid the risk of fraud. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as follows: 
H3: Rationalization has a positive effect on perceptions of financial reporting deficiencies 
 
Research conducted by Aprilla et al. (2018); Puspitha & Yasa (2018); and Zamzam et al. (2017), found that 
competence which is proxied by director changes and measured by dummy variables has a positive effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting. Wolfe & Hermanson (2004), also suggested that changes in directors were able to cause a stress 
period that resulted in more opportunities for fraud perception. The conclusion is someone's position in the organization 
can provide the ability to create or take advantage of opportunities to commit fraud. Theoretically, it can also be 
explained that the ability to commit fraud is caused by an interest in oneself to gain a lot of benefits for oneself (self-
interest). The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as follows: 
H4: Competence has a positive effect on perceptions of financial reporting fraud 
 
Research conducted by Tessa & Harto (2016); Bawekes et al. (2018); Pramana et al. (2019); and Puspitha & Yasa 
(2018), found that arrogance with a proxy for the number of CEO photos in the annual report had a positive effect on 
fraudulent financial reporting. The researchers explained that a CEO or board of directors who had quite a lot of 
pictures in the company's annual report judged that the CEO had a desire to be known by the public at large. 
Theoretically, it can be concluded that this trait arises because of the large self-interest (self-interest) that makes the 
arrogance even greater. This trait will trigger the belief that he will not be known if the fraud has occurred and the 
existing sanctions do not apply to him. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as 
follows: 
H5: Arrogance has a positive effect on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Inconsistencies that occur in previous studies encourage researchers to enter the moderating variable, namely good 
corporate governance. The researcher suspects that there are variables that interact with the influence of pressure on 
the perception of fraudulent financial reporting. Jensen & Meckling (1976), explained that there are costs that must be 
incurred to reduce the conflict of interest between agents and principals namely agency costs. Principals, in this case, 
are of course disadvantaged because they have to incur additional costs to reduce the conflict of interest. Based on 
POJK regulation number 4 / POJK.03 / 2015 article 1 (2) Good corporate governance can be applied consistently to 
reduce agency costs and reduce perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. It has also been proven empirically that 
the implementation of GCG has consistently been able to reduce fraud ( In'airat, 2015 and Kwatingtyas, 2017). It was 
concluded that the lower the pressure, the perception of fraudulent financial reporting would be lower, especially in 
companies with high good corporate governance. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation 
is as follows: 
H6: GCG weakens the positive effect of pressure on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Inconsistencies that occur in previous studies encourage researchers to enter the moderating variable, namely good 
corporate governance. The researcher suspects that there are variables that interact with the effect of opportunity on 
perceptions of financial reporting fraud. Jensen & Meckling (1976), explained that there are costs that must be incurred 
to reduce the conflict of interest between agents and principals namely agency costs. Principals, in this case, are of 
course disadvantaged because they have to incur additional costs to reduce the conflict of interest. POJK number 4 / 
POJK.03 / 2015 article 1 (2) concerning risk management and internal control systems explains that the implementation 
of consistent GCG is able to improve the supervision system and reduce opportunities for fraud. It has also been proven 
empirically that the implementation of GCG has consistently been able to reduce fraud ( In'airat, 2015 and Kwatingtyas, 
2017). It was concluded that the lower the opportunity, the perception of financial reporting fraud would be lower, 
especially in companies with high good corporate governance. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above 
explanation is as follows: 
H7: GCG weakens the positive effect of opportunity on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Inconsistencies that occur in previous studies encourage researchers to enter the moderating variable, namely good 
corporate governance. The researcher suspects that there are variables that interact with the effect of rationalization on 
perceptions of financial reporting fraud. Jensen & Meckling (1976), explained that there are costs that must be incurred 
to reduce the conflict of interest between agents and principals namely agency costs. Principals, in this case, are of 
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course disadvantaged because they have to incur additional costs to reduce the conflict of interest. POJK number 4 / 
POJK.03 / 2015 article 1 (2) explains that GCG can be applied consistently to reduce agency costs and reduce 
perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. It has also been proven empirically that the implementation of GCG has 
consistently been able to reduce fraud (In'airat, 2015 and Kwatingtyas, 2017). It was concluded that the lower the 
rationalization, the lower the perception of fraudulent financial reporting, especially in companies with high good 
corporate governance. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as follows: 
H8: GCG weakens the positive effect of rationalization on the perception of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Inconsistencies that occur in previous studies encourage researchers to enter the moderating variable, namely good 
corporate governance. The researcher suspects that there are variables that interact with the effect of competence on 
perceptions of financial reporting fraud. Jensen & Meckling (1976), explained that there are costs that must be incurred 
to reduce the conflict of interest between agents and principals namely agency costs. Principals, in this case, are of 
course disadvantaged because they have to incur additional costs to reduce the conflict of interest. POJK number 4 / 
POJK.03 / 2015 article 1 (2) explains that GCG can be applied consistently to reduce agency costs and reduce 
perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. It has also been proven empirically that the implementation of GCG has 
consistently been able to reduce fraud (In'airat, 2015 and Kwatingtyas, 2017). It was concluded that the lower the 
competence, the perception of fraudulent financial reporting will be lower, especially in companies with high good 
corporate governance. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as follows: 
H9: GCG weakens the positive effect of competence on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
The inconsistencies that occurred in previous studies encourage researchers to enter the moderating variable, namely 
good corporate governance. The researcher suspects that there are variables that interact with the influence of arrogance 
on the perception of financial reporting fraud. Principals, in this case, need to spend agency costs to control the arrogant 
nature contained in the agent. Agency costs incurred certainly hurt the principal because there are additional costs that 
need to be incurred. POJK number 4 / POJK.03 / 2015 article 1 (2) explains that GCG can be applied consistently to 
reduce these costs and increase internal supervision. Empirical evidence has also proven that when companies 
consistently implement GCG, they will be able to reduce fraud (In'airat, 2015 and Kwatingtyas, 2017). It was concluded 
that the lower the arrogance, the perception of fraudulent financial reporting would be lower, especially in companies 
with high good corporate governance. The hypothesis that can be described based on the above explanation is as 
follows: 
H10: GCG weakens the positive influence of arrogance on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
 
2   Materials and Methods 
 
The study was conducted on all employees who held directors and commissioner positions at PT BPR Bali Province. 
The reason for choosing the location was due to two cases that occurred in BPR KS BAS and BPR Legian whose 
business licenses were revoked due to the arrogance of the directors. ACFE (2018), also explained that the results of 
an analysis of 2,690 cases of work fraud in 125 countries worldwide from the period January 2016-October 2017 found 
that the banking and financial services sector had the highest number of cases from the 24 other sectors studied. 
The object of research is the problem under study. The object of research is limited to the perception of fraudulent 
financial reporting that is detected through indicators of the pentagon fraud theory with good corporate governance as 
a moderator. 
Researchers used all employees who held directors and commissioner positions at PT BPR Bali province to become 
the study population. PT BPR provinces registered until June 2019 there are 134 companies (OJK, 2019). The 
population-based on data from the OJK and the Indonesian People's Credit Bank Association (PERBARINDO) is 516 
employees from 134 registered rural banks. The sampling technique used is nonprobability sampling with the saturated 
sampling method. Thus, the number of samples used in this study is 225. The tolerance limit for sampling error is set 
at 5% because the value is closest to the total population of the study. The data analysis technique used in this study 
uses moderated regression analysis (MRA). 
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3   Results and Discussions 
 
Researchers use Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) which contains the interaction between multiplications of two 
or more dependent variables. The test results can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 
MRA testing result 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig 
B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 1,886 24,642  0,077 0,939 
TK -2,321 0,881 -2,731 -2,635 **0,009 
PL 1,564 0,768 1,728 2,037 *0,043 
RS 5,589 1,494 5,924 3,742 *0,000 
KM -1,279 1,353 -1,402 -0,945 0,346 
AR -0,368 0,558 -0,728 -0,659 0,511 
GCG 0,100 0,365 0,278 0,275 0,784 
TK*GCG 0,034 0,013 3,598 2,599 **0,010 
PL*GCG -0,023 0,011 -1,905 -2,040 *0,043 
RS*GCG -0,083 0,022 -7,359 -3,747 *0,000 
KM*GCG 0,020 0,020 1,812 0,999 0,319 
AR*GCG 0,008 0,008 1,434 0,976 0,330 
 RSquare 0,262 
 Adj R Square 0,221 
 Fhit 6,304 
 Sig.F 0,000 
Secondary Data, 2019 
p.s:  
*: Significant and appropriate with the hypothesis of the researcher. 
**: Significant but inappropriate with the hypothesis of the researcher. 
 
Information: 
TK = Pressure 
PL = Opportunity 
RS = Rationalization 
KM = Competence 
AR = Arrogance 
GCG = Good corporate governance 
β1-5 = Coefficient of independent variable regression 
β6 = Regression coefficient of moderating variable 
β7-11 = Coefficient of interaction between variables 
TK * GCG = Interaction between pressure and good corporate governance 
PL * GCG = Interaction between opportunity and good corporate governance 
RS * GCG = Interaction between rationalization with good corporate governance 
KM * GCG = Interaction between competencies and good corporate governance 
AR * GCG = Interaction between arrogance and good corporate governance 
 
F test 
 
F statistical test basically shows how far the influence of all independent variables simultaneously in explaining the 
variation of the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2016). The F test can be known by looking at the results of the regression 
which is done by comparing the level of significance of F with a 5% confidence level (α = 0.05) (Ghozali, 2016). Table 
5.14 shows that the calculated F value is 6.304 with a significance level of 0.000 less than α = 0.05, therefore the model 
is suitable to be used to prove the hypothesis formed. 
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Test the coefficient of determination (R2) 
 
The coefficient of determination (R2) basically measures how far the model's ability to explain the variation of the 
dependent variable (Ghozali, 2016). Table 1. shows that the adjusted R2 value of 0.221 means that 22.1% of the 
variable perception of financial reporting fraud can be explained by the pressure, opportunity, rationality, competence, 
arrogance and GCG variables that moderate all indicators of the pentagon theory fraud, the remaining 77.9 % is 
influenced by other variables not included in the model. 
 
Partial significance test (t-test) 
The Effect of pressure on perceptions of financial reporting fraud 
 
The MRA test results show that the pressure variable has a regression coefficient of -2,321 and a significance value of 
0.00. These results indicate that the hypothesis is rejected. This means that when individuals in this case directors and 
commissioners in BPR when under pressure then the perception of fraud in financial reporting will not arise due to 
fear of the risks that will be faced. Theoretically also explained by Einshardt (1989), who explained that to meet the 
interests of individuals, avoiding risk (risk-averse) is a natural thing when individuals get pressure. These results are 
also supported by several previous researchers who found there were negative effects of pressures on fraudulent 
financial reporting such as Setiawati & Baningrum (2018); Nindito (2018); Husmawati et al. (2017); and Prasmaulida 
(2016), with theoretical conclusions as revealed Einshardt (1989). 
 
The Effect of opportunity on perceptions of financial reporting fraud 
 
MRA test results indicate that the opportunity variable has a regression coefficient of 1.569 and a significance value 
of 0.04. These results indicate that the hypothesis is accepted. This is in line with the fraud triangle theory explained 
by Cressey (1953), that the opportunity indicator in the theory influences fraud. Individuals, in this case, are directors 
and commissioners at BPR when they get the chance, it will bring up the perception of fraud and more specifically the 
perception of fraud in financial reporting. It is also in line with the explanation of agency theory which states that to 
maximize individual utility can be done by utilizing opportunities to commit fraud. The results are also similar to some 
previous studies which explain the positive influence between opportunities and fraud such as Kusuma et al. (2017); 
Muhsin & Nurkhin (2018); and Rukmana (2018), with theoretical conclusions such as agency theory and fraud triangle 
theory. 
 
The effect of rationality on the perception of fraudulent financial reporting 
 
The MRA test results show that the rationality variable has a regression coefficient of 5.589 and a significance value 
of 0.00. These results indicate that the hypothesis is accepted. These results indicate that there is a positive effect of 
rationality on the perception of fraudulent financial reporting. It is also in line with the explanation of fraud triangle 
theory explained by Cressey (1953), which explains that the indicator of rationality influences fraud. Agency theory 
also explains that when individuals want to maximize their utility by fraudulent financial reporting, actions of 
rationality can help individuals to cover these opportunistic perceptions. These results are also supported by several 
previous researchers who explain that rationality has a positive effect on fraudulent financial reporting (Oka et al. 
2018; Aprilla et al. 2018; and Siddiq, 2017). 
 
The Effect of competence on perceptions of financial reporting fraud 
 
The MRA test results show that the competency variable has a regression coefficient of -1.279 and a significance value 
of 0.34. These results indicate that the hypothesis is rejected. This is not in accordance with additional indicators from 
Horwarth (2011), in the explanation of fraud pentagon theory. Descriptive statistics explain that the average respondent 
was indicated to have competence. The conclusion is that when individuals in this case directors and commissioners 
have the competence (ability), the individual actually wants to show maximum performance for certain motivations as 
well as bonuses in terms of positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmeraman, 1986). It is also in accordance with the 
questionnaire indicated that the highest average answer on the maximum freedom indicator in doing work, which 
indicates that the individual will be easier to achieve motivation. Other research also supports this, that when 
individuals have the ability or get a position then the individual is actually more motivated to want to get more bonuses 
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by maximizing performance and improving performance that was previously considered less than optimal (Aprilia, 
2017; Quraini & Rimawati, 2018; and Junardi et al., 2018). 
 
The Effect of arrogance on perceptions of financial reporting fraud 
 
The MRA test results show that the arrogance variable has a regression coefficient of -0.386 and a significance value 
of 0.51. These results indicate that the hypothesis is rejected. Arrogance in explaining pentagon theory fraud has not 
been proven to be able to influence fraud. Descriptive statistics explain that there is an indication of arrogance in the 
sample of researchers, but this does not merely lead to perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. This also 
corresponds to the highest average answer on the questionnaire indicated that it is in the approval-seeking indicator, 
which indicates that the arrogance of the research respondents is limited to the arrogant attitude that other individuals 
want to acknowledge and not the arrogant nature that can lead to perceptions of fraud. 
Danuta (2017), explains that when an individual has an arrogance but does not have the competence then cheating 
will be difficult due to the lack of ability to commit fraud. Previous researchers also explained that arrogance did not 
affect financial reporting fraud because the measurement of these variables was quite difficult and could not only be 
seen by the number of images in company documents (Setiawati & Baningrum, 2018; Junardi et al. 2018; and Aprilia, 
2017). 
 
The ability of good corporate governance to moderate the effects of pressure on perceptions of fraudulent financial 
reporting 
 
The MRA test results showed that the pressure interaction with GCG had a coefficient value of 0.034 with a 
significance of 0.01. The direct effect of the pressure variable has a coefficient of -2,321, meaning that GCG weakens 
the negative effect of pressure on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. These results indicate that the 
hypothesis was rejected. Weakening the negative influence means that the consistent application of GCG in BPR is 
able to reduce and prevent the perception of fraudulent financial reporting arising from other factors felt by the 
individual. The consistent implementation of GCG based on POJK regulation number 4 / POJK.03 / 2015 can help 
BPRs in handling all forms of conflict of interest such as conflicts of interest and also be able to increase the 
transparency of financial and non-financial conditions. It is also in accordance with agency theory which explains that 
when there is a conflict of interest in a company, the agency costs in a company will increase, and to reduce these 
costs, GCG can be applied consistently. These results have also been consistent with some previous researchers who 
have proven that the consistent application of GCG is able to reduce fraud (Luthan & Satria, 2016; Saputra, 2017; and 
Pamungkas et al., 2018). 
 
The ability of good corporate governance to moderate the effect of opportunities on perceptions of fraudulent financial 
reporting 
 
The MRA test results show that the opportunity interaction variable with GCG has a coefficient value of -0.023 with 
a significance of 0.04. The direct effect of opportunity variable has a coefficient value of 1.569, meaning that GCG 
weakens the positive effect of opportunity on perceptions of financial reporting fraud. These results indicate that the 
hypothesis is accepted. Weakening the positive influence means that the consistent application of GCG in BPR is able 
to reduce and prevent the perception of fraudulent financial reporting arising from opportunities owned by individuals. 
These results are also in accordance with agency theory where when there is a conflict of interest, GCG is able to 
reduce agency costs arising from the conflict of interest. These results have also been consistent with some previous 
researchers who have proven that the consistent application of GCG is able to reduce fraud (Luthan & Satria, 2016; 
Saputra, 2017; and Pamungkas et al., 2018). 
 
 
The ability of good corporate governance to moderate the effect of rationalization on the perception of fraudulent 
financial reporting 
 
The MRA test results show that the interaction between rationality and GCG has a coefficient of -0.083 with a 
significance of 0.00. The direct effect of the pressure variable has a coefficient of 5.589, meaning that GCG weakens 
the positive effect of rationality on the perception of financial reporting fraud. These results indicate that the hypothesis 
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is accepted. Weakening the positive influence means that the consistent application of GCG is able to reduce and 
prevent the perception of fraudulent financial reporting arising from individual rationalizations. These results are also 
in accordance with agency theory where when there is a conflict of interest, GCG is able to reduce agency costs arising 
from the conflict of interest. These results are also consistent with some previous researchers who have proven that the 
consistent application of GCG is able to reduce fraud (Luthan & Satria, 2016; Saputra, 2017; and Pamungkas et al., 
2018). 
 
The ability of good corporate governance to moderate the effect of competence on perceptions of financial reporting 
fraud 
 
The MRA test results show that the ability interaction variable with GCG has a coefficient value of 0.020 with a 
significance of 0.31. This means that GCG does not moderate the effect of ability on perceptions of financial reporting 
fraud. These results indicate that the hypothesis was rejected. Inconsistent with some of the previous researchers who 
explained that the application of GCG is able to reduce financial reporting fraud (Luthan & Satria, 2016; Saputra, 
2017; and Pamungkas et al., 2018). GCG does not moderate the influence of ability on the perception of fraud meaning 
that the competencies of BPR directors and commissioners are used to maximize performance in order to achieve 
maximum bonuses, and are not solely used to practice the perception of fraudulent financial reporting. Therefore, the 
function of GCG, in this case, is only used as a guide for the individual to help maximize their performance. These 
results support the research of Astuti et al. (2019), which explains that the average implementation of Islamic banking 
corporate governance is good, but not enough to prevent fraud. That is because the sharia supervisory board is more 
focused on product supervision whether it is in accordance with sharia principles. 
 
The ability of good corporate governance to balance the influence of arrogance on perceptions of financial reporting 
fraud 
 
The MRA test results show that the ability interaction variable with GCG has a coefficient value of 0.008 with a 
significance of 0.33. This means that GCG does not moderate the effect of arrogance on perceptions of financial 
reporting fraud. These results indicate that the hypothesis was rejected. GCG does not moderate means that the 
application of GCG in BPR will be difficult to reduce or even unable to prevent the perception of fraudulent financial 
reporting arising from the nature of arrogance because individuals who have an arrogance nature will assume that if 
there are rules in the company then they will feel that internal control does not apply to itself as a result of arrogance 
arising from individual positions/positions. These results are in accordance with Astuti et al. (2019), which explains 
that the application of corporate governance has not been able to prevent fraud. Ismiyanti & Prastichia (2015), also 
explained that corporate governance consisting of independent commissioners, commissioners' meetings, length of 
service tenure of directors, largest share ownership and type of auditor did not influence financial statement fraud. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
 
This research can provide theoretical and practical benefits. Theoretically, it can be used as a reference for other 
researchers who will conduct further research. Practically, this research can be considered by companies in terms of 
GCG. BPR, in this case, is obliged to apply GCG consistently to help improve individual performance and reduce 
perceptions of financial reporting fraud arising from several pentagon theory fraud indicators. 
The pressure variable has a negative effect on the perception of financial reporting fraud. Individuals in this case 
directors and commissioners in BPR when under pressure then the perception of fraud in financial reporting will not 
arise due to fear of the risks to be faced. This is in accordance with the explanation of Einshardt (1989), who explained 
that to meet the interests of individuals, avoiding risk (risk-averse) is a natural thing when individuals get pressure. 
The opportunity variable has a positive effect on the perception of financial reporting fraud. Individuals, when they 
get the opportunity, will bring up the perception of fraud and more specifically the perception of fraud in financial 
reporting. It is also in line with the explanation of agency theory which states that to maximize individual utility can 
be done by utilizing opportunities to commit fraud. 
Variable rationality has a positive effect on perceptions of financial reporting fraud. These results are consistent 
with agency theory which explains that when individuals want to maximize their utility by committing financial 
reporting fraud, acts of rationality can help individuals to mask these opportunistic perceptions. 
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The competency variable does not affect the perception of financial reporting fraud. These results explain that when 
individuals in this case directors and commissioners have the competence (ability or position), the individual actually 
wants to show maximum performance for certain motivations as well as bonuses in the case of positive accounting 
theory, instead of giving rise to opportunistic perceptions such as fraudulent financial reporting. 
The arrogance variable does not affect the perception of financial reporting fraud. These results explain that the 
nature of arrogance that exists in individuals is not merely able to bring up the perception of financial reporting fraud. 
Danuta (2017), explains that when an individual has an arrogance but does not have the competence then cheating will 
be difficult due to the lack of ability within the individual to commit fraud. 
GCG weakens the negative influence of pressure on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. Weakening the 
negative influence means that the consistent application of GCG in BPR is able to reduce and prevent the perception 
of fraudulent financial reporting arising from other factors felt by the individual. Regression test results on the 
interaction of these variables indicate that GCG is a type of pure moderation. 
GCG weakens the positive influence of opportunity on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. Weakening 
the positive influence means that the consistent application of GCG in BPR is able to reduce and prevent the perception 
of fraudulent financial reporting arising from opportunities owned by individuals. Regression test results on the 
interaction of these variables indicate that GCG is a type of pure moderation. 
GCG weakens the positive effect of rationality on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. Weakening the 
positive influence means that the consistent application of GCG is able to reduce and prevent the perception of 
fraudulent financial reporting arising from individual rationalizations. These results are also in accordance with agency 
theory where when there is a conflict of interest, GCG is able to reduce agency costs arising from the conflict of 
interest. Regression test results on the interaction of these variables indicate that GCG is a type of pure moderation. 
GCG does not moderate the effect of competence on perceptions of fraudulent financial reporting. GCG does not 
moderate the influence of ability on the perception of fraud meaning that the competencies of BPR directors and 
commissioners are used to maximize performance in order to achieve maximum bonuses, and are not solely used to 
practice the perception of fraudulent financial reporting. Therefore, the function of GCG, in this case, is only used as 
a guide for the individual to help maximize their performance. Regression test results on the interaction of these 
variables indicate that GCG is a type of potential moderation. 
GCG does not moderate the effect of arrogance on perceptions of financial reporting fraud. GCG does not moderate 
means that the application of GCG in BPR will be difficult to reduce or even unable to prevent the perception of 
fraudulent financial reporting arising from the nature of arrogance because individuals who have an arrogance nature 
will assume that if there are rules in the company then they will feel that internal control does not apply to itself as a 
result of arrogance arising from individual positions/positions. 
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